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Somehow I never learned how to lie prostrate 
before sacred cows. It’s not that I lack idolatrous 
inclinations; it’s just that I regularly underestimate 
the sacred nature of prevailing bovine statues in 
the neighborhood. It’s not that I’m an eager icono-
clast; it’s just that I’m enough of a newcomer to 
various conversations that I don’t always appreciate 
the sacrosanct status of “our” concepts. 
For example, I quickly learned that if you write 
a book on Christian education and offhandedly 
(and somewhat tongue-in-cheek) suggest even a 
temporary “moratorium” on the notion of “world-
view,” you can expect some animated responses 
and festering suspicion.1  The villagers begin to get 
restless, so to speak, even if you thought you were a 
citizen of the village. This suspicion has character-
ized some of the response to Desiring the Kingdom in 
Reformed quarters of Christian higher education. 
This essay addresses some of those concerns by 
providing something of a guide to the argument of 
Desiring the Kingdom for Reformed folk who might 
be perplexed by some of my claims and proposals.2 
In the process, I hope I can reestablish that I’m one 
of “us” and even that the core of my argument is 
unapologetically Reformed. 
To do so, I will very briefly rehearse the argu-
ment of Desiring the Kingdom. It begins from a sort 
of working axiom that every pedagogy assumes an 
anthropology: that is, every approach to education 
assumes some model of the human person, even 
if this anthropology is never made explicit. Thus, 
our understanding of the nature and goal of educa-
tion is shaped by what we think human beings are. 
So if you (implicitly) think that human beings are 
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essentially thinking things—containers for ideas, 
beliefs, and propositions—then you will end up 
conceiving of education as a primarily informa-
tive project: the dissemination of ideas and beliefs 
into mind-receptacles. And I argue that much of 
the recent rhetoric about “worldview” in Christian 
higher education falls into this camp: it tends to 
think about the nature and task of Christian educa-
tion as the dissemination of certain content, or the 
provision of a Christian “perspective” on how to 
think about the world. 
The argument of Desiring the Kingdom is not that 
this is wrong but only that it is inadequate, and 
this inadequacy stems from the stunted anthropol-
ogy that is assumed. Or, to put this in terms I first 
learned from the Reformational tradition, such a 
picture of education is insufficiently radical because 
it doesn’t get to the root of our identity. By focus-
ing on the cognitive and intellectual, such a model 
of the person—and its corresponding picture of 
education—undervalues and underestimates the 
importance of the affective; by focusing on what 
we think and believe, such a model misses the cen-
trality and primacy of what we love; by focusing on 
education as the dissemination of information, we 
have missed the ways in which Christian education 
is really a project of formation. In other words, at the 
heart of Desiring the Kingdom’s argument is an antire-
ductionism and the affirmation of a more holistic 
understanding of human persons and Christian 
education. And such antireductionism and holism 
I learned at the feet of Herman Dooyeweerd and 
Calvin Seerveld. 
Thus, I make three intertwined proposals in 
the book, all indebted to Saint Augustine, that pa-
tron saint of the Reformers: first, I sketch an alter-
native anthropology that emphasizes the primacy 
of love and the priority of the imagination in shap-
ing our identity and governing our orientation to 
the world;3 second, I emphasize that education is 
also about the formation (“aiming”) of our love and 
desire, and that such formation happens through 
embodied, communal rituals we might call “litur-
gies”—including a range of “secular” liturgies that 
are pedagogies of desire; third, given the forma-
tive priority of liturgical practices, I argue that the 
task of Christian education needs to be resituated 
within the ecclesial practices of Christian worship 
and liturgical formation. In other words, we need 
to reconnect worship and worldview, church and 
college. 
As I should have guessed, this nexus of pro-
posals set off alarms for those within a Reformed 
(especially Kuyperian) orbit. Let me try to formu-
late these as the FAQs often directed to Desiring 
the Kingdom, and then extend the conversation by 
trying to answer these questions here:
1. Is this really Reformed? How could a 
proposal that is critical of the notion of 
“worldview” be Reformed? And isn’t the 
“worldview” that’s being rejected here re-
ally only a caricature? 
2. Isn’t this just a new-fangled version of old, 
fundamentalist anti-intellectualism? Isn’t 
this just Jamie returning to his emotivist 
Pentecostal heritage? Doesn’t this model 
give comfort to those who would denigrate 
the life of the mind and the importance of 
critical Christian reflection? Isn’t Desiring 
the Kingdom just retreating to the status quo 
that generated the so-called scandal of the 
evangelical mind?
3. Aren’t we in danger of blurring impor-
tant boundaries between the church and 
the college? In other words, doesn’t this 
proposal violate the sovereignty of the 
spheres—making the school into the 
church? Don’t we need some border patrol 
here?
These are all very fair concerns. They get to 
the heart of whether the sort of college envisioned 
in Desiring the Kingdom is really “Reformed.” I’m 
grateful for the opportunity to address these three 
sets of concerns as a way of trying to establish 
the Reformed pedigree of the “ecclesial college” 
sketched at the end of Desiring the Kingdom. 
I.  Whose Worldview? Which Calvinism?
Does Desiring the Kingdom pull the rug out from 
under the very project of Reformed higher educa-
tion by rejecting the notion of worldview? A very 
simple answer is, “No.” A more complex, nuanced 
answer is, “Kinda maybe sorta.” Let me explain.
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A.  Two Cheers for Worldview
To be very clear, nowhere in Desiring the Kingdom 
do I reject the notion of worldview. Indeed, if I can 
offer a bit of personal testimony, the truth is that, 
for me, the discovery of “worldview thinking” was 
revolutionary. I’m a whole-hearted worldview con-
vert, as it were. Having been converted to Christian 
faith through a very dualistic, anti-intellectual tra-
dition (the Plymouth Brethren—a named target in 
Kuyper’s “Common Grace” lecture!), I found the 
“world-affirming” ethos of the Reformed tradition 
to be both liberating and illuminating. The holism 
of this “worldview” paradigm has informed ev-
ery aspect of my work; yea, it’s precisely why I an-
swered the call to become a Christian scholar. It’s 
also why, now, when I face students who have been 
hearing about the Reformed “worldview” of “cre-
ation-fall-redemption” since kindergarten (having 
been blessed with a lifetime of Christian educa-
tion in the Reformed tradition where these mat-
ters are taken for granted), I’m not sure whether to 
yell or cry when I see their jaded eyes glaze over. I 
do somersaults to try to get them to (re)appreciate 
the genius and wisdom embedded in “worldview” 
thinking, which, in my experience, broke open the 
world for me. 
So I have to confess that I find it odd when 
readers conclude that Desiring the Kingdom rejects the 
notion of worldview. It certainly offers a critique of 
where this model has gone, but it does not amount 
to a “rejection” of worldview—even if I do counsel 
a (temporary) “moratorium” on the term. Indeed, on 
the opening page of the book (on the first page of 
the Preface) I note that, though my project is to 
“push down through worldview to worship as the 
matrix from which a Christian worldview is born,” 
“[t]his doesn’t require rejecting worldview-talk, 
only situating it in relation to Christian practices” 
(11).4  In fact, in the next sentence I offer Desiring 
the Kingdom as a “companion volume” to classic 
worldview texts such as Walsh and Middleton’s 
Transforming Vision, Wolters’ Creation Regained, and 
Neal Plantinga’s Engaging God’s World.5 
All that is simply to emphasize that, rather than 
being a “sustained attack” on worldview, Desiring 
the Kingdom offers two cheers for this paradigm. 
Indeed, the whole project assumes the worldview 
paradigm in order to refine and recalibrate it. 
B.  On the Inadequacies of Worldview: Or, 
Reading Wendell Berry in Costco
So where does this perception come from? 
What is it about Desiring the Kingdom that makes 
people worried that I’m abandoning the impor-
tance of worldview for Christian higher education? 
On the one hand, I spend some time noting that 
the model of “worldview” I’m rejecting is a kind of 
mutated version that has emerged precisely when 
worldview-talk went evangelical, so to speak, un-
hooked from the creation-affirming holism of the 
Reformed tradition (DTK 31-32). My concern is 
that just when it seems as if everybody is adopting 
a “worldview” approach, what we get in the name 
of “worldview” is a stunted step-brother of the ho-
listic “complex” Abraham Kuyper spoke of when 
discussing the Calvinist “world-and life-view.”6  
On the other hand, I think there remain le-
gitimate concerns with even the best rendition of 
“worldview” approaches insofar as they tend to 
still conceive the task of Christian education as 
the dissemination of a perspective, a way to see the 
world. My criticism here is not that this is wrong 
but only that it is inadequate. It is an approach that 
imagines us (and our students) as primarily specta-
tors of the world rather than as actors in the world. 
My concern is that 
just when it seems as if 
everybody is adopting a 
“worldview” approach, 
what we get in the name 
of “worldview” is a stunted 
step-brother of the holistic 
“complex” Abraham 
Kuyper spoke of when 
discussing the Calvinist 
“world- and life-view.”6
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But if one of the goals of Christian education is to 
form what Neal Plantinga describes as “prime citi-
zens of the kingdom,” then we need to appreciate 
that we act as citizens, not primarily on the basis of 
cognitive deliberation, or even on the basis of our 
“perspectives,” but for the most part on the basis 
of acquired habits, unconscious desires, and pre-
intellectual dispositions. And so our education has 
to be attuned to how those desires and dispositions 
are formed. We might have a highly developed, ar-
ticulate “worldview” and yet act in ways that are 
remarkably inconsistent with such a “perspective.” 
Let me try to make sense of this with an ex-
ample: over the past several years, through the 
steady evangelism of my wife, Deanna, I have be-
come more and more convinced about the injustice 
of our dominant systems of food production and 
consumption. Through the influence of people 
like Barbara Kingsolver, Michael Pollan, and espe-
cially Wendell Berry, I have become intellectually 
convinced that they offer the best perspective for 
thinking about these issues. Indeed, in many ways 
I’ve owned their perspective as my own. 
But a funny thing happened on the way to the 
grocery store: I discovered a significant gap be-
tween my thought and my action. This hit home 
to me one day while I was immersed in reading 
Wendell Berry’s delightful anthology, Bringing It 
to the Table. As I paused to reflect on a key point, 
and thus briefly took my nose out of the book, I 
was suddenly struck by an ugly irony: here I was 
reading Wendell Berry in the food court at Costco. 
There are so many things wrong with that sentence 
I don’t even know where to begin: indeed, “the 
food court at Costco” might be a kind of short-
hand for Berry’s picture of the sixth circle of hell. 
So how might one account for this gap be-
tween my thought and my action—between my 
passionate intellectual assent to these ideas and my 
status quo action? Well, this is exactly the intuition 
at the heart of Desiring the Kingdom: While Pollan 
and Berry may have successfully recruited my in-
tellect, they have not been successful in converting 
my habits. Nor could they be, for too much of my 
action and orientation to the world is governed by 
dispositions that are shaped by practice. 
Implicit in the anthropology of Desiring the 
Kingdom is a philosophy of action—a tacit assump-
tion about what drives or causes human behav-
ior and action, and such a philosophy of action is 
germane to the goal and task of Christian educa-
tion. Desiring the Kingdom’s account of the formative 
power of both “secular liturgies” and intentional 
Christian worship has a certain urgency precisely 
because it assumes that most of our orientation 
to—and action in—the world is governed by pre-
conscious habits and patterns of behavior, and that 
those habits are formed by environments of prac-
tice. This view stands in contrast to what Charles 
Taylor calls “intellectualist”7 or “decisionist” mod-
els, which tend to overestimate “thinking” as the 
cause of action. This view does not entail a crass 
determinism; nor does it exclude a role for reflec-
tive, deliberative, conscious “choice.” However, 
such a model—shored up by recent research in 
cognitive science—does relativize the role of ra-
tiocinative deliberation in action. More positively, 
it highlights the significant impact of environment 
(and attendant practices) in shaping our “adaptive 
unconscious,” which then steers/drives action at a 
preconscious level. As such, we should be increas-
ingly attentive to the formative role of environ-
ment and practice in shaping our desires.
The response to such a situation is not simply 
pressing people to think more about what they’re 
doing. Consider another example from eating and 
practices associated with food. In his book Mindless 
Eating, Cornell nutritionist Brian Wansink accounts 
for the American obesity epidemic in terms of the 
habits and practices that unconsciously shape our 
tastes and eating patterns.8  We are trained to ori-
ent ourselves to food and food systems by prac-
tices and environments that shape our orientation 
at a preconscious level—and then we regularly act 
on the basis of those malformed desires. We eat 
“mindlessly.” However, what’s most significant is 
Wansink’s antidote to this problem: it is not a mat-
ter of mindful eating. Drawing on extensive psy-
chological research, Wansink demonstrates that 
we simply are not the sorts of animals who can be 
deliberatively “on” all the time. So the proper re-
sponse to unhealthy mindless eating is not mindful 
eating but rather healthy mindless eating, changing 
environments and practices in order to form dif-
ferent (unconscious) habits. 
A “worldview approach” would assume that 
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the proper response to mindless eating is mind-
ful eating. Similarly, an “intellectualist” model of 
education would assume that the proper response 
to the unconscious formation of “secular liturgies” 
would be “critical reflection,” thinking about it more, 
thinking about what we’re doing. Of course, such re-
flection and thinking is important and crucial; and 
the articulation of a Christian worldview is help-
ful—but as I’ve already pointed out, you can read 
Wendell Berry in Costco. The argument of Desiring 
the Kingdom is not that we need less than worldview, 
but more: that Christian education will only be fully 
an education to the extent that it is also a formation 
of our habits. And such formation happens not 
only, or even primarily, by equipping the intellect 
but through the repetitive formation of embodied, 
communal practices. And as I suggest in Desiring 
the Kingdom, the “core” practices in this respect are 
specifically the practices of Christian worship. But 
before turning to a consideration of the role of 
worship in Christian education, let me address a 
second concern: that Desiring the Kingdom encour-
ages a retreat back into anti-intellectual pietism. 
II.  A Hearts and Minds Strategy: On Anti-
intellectualism
Granted, in Desiring the Kingdom I basically ar-
gue that discussions of Christian higher education 
overestimate the importance of thinking. This 
is generally not a good strategy for trying to win 
friends and influence people when the people in-
volved consider themselves thinkers. Furthermore, 
many of those toiling in the not-so-ivory halls of 
Christian colleges and universities would be quite 
surprised to hear that thinking is being overvalued 
in North American Christianity. Indeed, quite the 
opposite seems to be true: evangelical piety tends 
to intensify a general anti-intellectual malaise that 
besets our culture. The response to such a situation 
would be to encourage more thinking, not less—to 
emphasize the importance of the mind, not fall back 
into the soppy mushiness of “the heart” and its af-
fections. In short, with its critique of “rationalist” 
or “intellectualist” models of the human person, it 
would seem that Desiring the Kingdom plays right into 
the hands of anti-intellectualism.9 
Indeed, some seem to worry that, on my mod-
el, we’d just spend all day in chapel or that the 
Christian college would just be a glorified Sunday 
school. But such worries stem from a misunder-
standing of my emphasis on worship with respect 
to worldview;10 in particular, such a worry seems 
to read my claim—that  worship is a necessary and 
important condition for integral Christian educa-
tion—as if I were saying this was a sufficient condi-
tion for Christian education. But I’m not suggest-
ing we raze the physics labs and expand the chapel. 
I’m not suggesting we demolish the literature class-
room and all just stay in church all week. Nor do I 
anywhere suggest that a Christian university is not 
about the business of ideas!  Of course it is; the issue 
is whether it is just trafficking in ideas. It’s the latter 
that I’m rejecting. 
However, let me honor this worry about an-
ti-intellectualism by pointing out two things in 
response: First, I will concede that, on the basis 
of a hasty and selective reading, the argument 
of Desiring the Kingdom could “fall into the wrong 
hands,” so to speak. That is, a superficial reading 
of the project might misunderstand it as giving 
comfort to just the sort of anti-intellectualism that 
Reformed evangelical scholars have been working 
to undo. While I don’t think a close reading of the 
argument bears this out, I think I understand how 
this happened: quite simply, I inhabit a stream of 
the Christian tradition where devotion to the life 
of the mind has deep roots. And such a commit-
ment to the “life of the mind” was so assumed in 
my argument that I could criticize a certain “ra-
tionalist” overemphasis without ever worrying 
The argument of Desiring 
the Kingdom is not 
that we need less than 
worldview, but more: that 
Christian education will 
only be fully an education 
to the extent that it is also a 
formation of our habits. 
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that this would give license to abandoning critical 
thinking.11  
Second, let me just emphasize that my goal is 
not to denigrate the intellect but to situate theoreti-
cal reflection within the wider purview of our fun-
damental pre-theoretical orientation to the world.12 
From this goal, some too hastily conclude that 
relativizing the intellectual is somehow a rejection 
of the intellectual, but that clearly doesn’t follow. 
Desiring the Kingdom is pressing us to consider the 
significance of our non- and pre-intellectual orien-
tation of the world, to appreciate all of the ways 
in which this shapes and governs our being in the 
world, and to therefore expand what we consider 
as falling within the purview of education. To situ-
ate (and relativize) the intellect is not anti-intellec-
tual; it is emphasizing that even rationality needs 
to be faithful, needs to be disciplined and trained. 
And this seems to be a deeply biblical sensibility. 
Indeed, Paul’s prayer for the Christians in Philippi 
could easily be the epigraph of Desiring the Kingdom:
And this I pray, that your love may abound still 
more and more in real knowledge and all discern-
ment, so that you may determine what really mat-
ters… (Phi. 1.9-10, NASB, revised)
Our knowledge and discernment is guided and 
shaped by our loves. And love takes practice.
The fact that our loves guide and shape our 
knowledge and discernment is my reason for em-
phasizing the implications: education operates on 
this pre-theoretical register whether we recognize 
it or not. Pedagogies of desire form our habits, 
affections, and imaginations, thus shaping and 
priming our very orientation to the world. So if 
a Christian education is going to be holistic and 
formative, it needs to attend to much more than 
the intellect; for this reason,  I emphasize that  a 
unique “understanding” is “carried” in Christian 
practices, particularly the practices of Christian 
worship. It is in such practices that our love is 
“trained,” disciplined, shaped, and formed. And it 
is, to some extent, only in such practices that this 
training, disciplining, shaping, and forming can 
happen. Attention to intellect is insufficient pre-
cisely because there is an irreducible, unique “un-
derstanding” that is only carried in practices.
 Let me try to make sense of this point with 
an analogy between literature and liturgy, drawing 
on the work of Merleau-Ponty.13 Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology provides the framework to more 
carefully articulate the core claim of Desiring the 
Kingdom: that love is its own kind of knowing, oper-
ative on a “pre-theoretical” register. For Merleau-
Ponty, this knowing requires taking our embodiment 
more seriously, charting a space between “intel-
lect” and instinct, between reflection and reflex. As 
he poetically puts it, “my body is the pivot of the 
world.”14  What he’s describing—and what I was 
trying to describe in Desiring the Kingdom—is a kind 
of “preconscious knowledge” which is “not of the 
kind: ‘I think that….’”15  
Merleau-Ponty describes this kind of knowl-
edge as “motor intentionality,”16 a kind of bodily 
knowledge that cannot be articulated in propo-
sitional form. Our actions and movement, then, 
are not “handmaidens of consciousness” as if the 
outcome of deliberative representation; to the con-
trary, “[c]onsciousness is being-towards-the-thing 
through the intermediary of the body. A move-
ment is learned when the body has understood it, 
that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘world,’ 
and to move one’s body is to aim at things through 
it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call.”17 
He names this “praktognosia”—an irreducible 
know-how that gets into our bones: “Our bodily 
experience of movement is not a particular case 
of knowledge; it provides us with a way of access 
to the world and the object, with a ‘praktognosia,’ 
which has to be recognized as original and perhaps 
as primary.”18  Thus Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy of embodiment and “motor intentionality” 
provides resources to understand the mechanics of 
liturgical formation, which is also bodily—another 
kind of “training” or “praktognosia.” 
Furthermore, his phenomenological frame-
work can also help us understand the function of 
narrative, story, and literature.19  For example, in 
considering the case study of “Schneider”—whose 
brain injury has eliminated his praktognosia and 
requires him to think through everything—Merleau-
Ponty notes that because of this condition, 
Schneider is unable to understand stories. “[I]ndeed 
if a story is told to the patient, it is observed that in-
stead of grasping it as a melodic whole with down 
and up beats, with its characteristic rhythm or flow, 
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he remembers it only as a succession of facts to be 
noted one by one.”20  This is because there is a kind 
of knowledge “carried” in stories which cannot be 
processed didactically, cannot be paraphrased.21  
III.Church, College, and Sphere Sovereignty:  
Re-reading Kuyper
Desiring the Kingdom, then, argues that a holistic, 
formative Christian education not only will  equip 
students with a Christian perspective  but also must 
form students through Christian practice—for 
only practiced formation will adequately capture 
our imaginations and convert our habits such that 
our orientation and action in the world is aimed 
at the shalom God desires for his creation.22  This 
wider goal means that Christian colleges and uni-
versities must be not only informed by a Christian 
worldview but also nourished by Christian worship, 
for it is the historic, intentional, communal prac-
tices of Christian worship that “carry” a formative, 
liturgical “understanding” of God’s redemptive 
good news.23  And this “know-how”—this prak-
tognosia—cannot be paraphrased; it cannot be 
adequately translated into the portability of propo-
sitions. It can only be absorbed through practice.
On this account, Christian worship (and other 
related Christian practices24) is not just beneficial 
to the task of Christian education but essential. 
Through the practices of Christian worship, we ac-
quire a tacit know-how that shapes our action, in-
cluding our theoretical activity. These practices are 
meant to form us as a people who desire the king-
dom and who embody a foretaste of that coming 
kingdom. But before we ever articulate a Christian 
worldview, we absorb a visceral understanding of 
God’s kingdom in the practice of Christian wor-
ship. If we believe in order to understand, you 
might say we worship in order to worldview.
It is this part of my argument that raises the 
final cluster of concerns for Reformed folk: doesn’t 
this sound as if I’m collapsing the church as “or-
ganism” into the church as “institute?” Doesn’t 
this blur the boundaries between church and 
school, between these sovereign spheres? This all 
starts to sound a bit, well, “Catholic.”
Let me address this concern from a couple of 
angles.
First, I’ll confess that I am quite intentionally 
countering a certain kind of Kuyperianism; but 
that might not be the same as countering Kuyper. 
Kuyper has been inherited in different ways in 
North America, yielding different Kuyperianisms. 
While Zwaanstra suggests that “ecclesiology was 
the core of [Kuyper’s] theology,”25 one quickly 
notes that it is the church as organism that is the 
“heart” of his doctrine. This emphasis, coupled 
with some other emphases in Kuyper, led to a 
strain of Kuyperianism that actually had little 
place for the church as institute in its understand-
ing of Christian engagement with culture. Indeed, 
there have even been strains of Kuyperianism that 
have been quite anti-ecclesial. On the other hand, 
Kuyper himself clearly saw a crucial role for the 
church as institute and devoted a great deal of his 
time, energy, and gifts to its welfare and reform.26 
The fact that he did, signals that there might be a 
different way to inherit Kuyper on this score. This 
idea invites us to re-read Kuyper with new eyes, 
and I’d like to briefly offer such a re-reading here. 
Let’s take, as an example, his classic statement 
of sphere sovereignty and the institute/organism 
distinction in “Common Grace.”27  In order to get 
to the heart of the matter, permit me a brief detour 
into his argument. We should first appreciate that 
he’s doing battle on two fronts: on the one hand, 
he is opposing the model of a “national church” 
(which was then still a sort of live option in the 
Netherlands); on the other hand, he is battling “sec-
tarianism,” which is the ecclesiological outworking 
of the pietism he has already criticized. Let’s pick 
this up in his critique of the national church.
Note, first, where Kuyper says that he agrees 
with the national church “party”: “[W]e and they 
Through the practices of 
Christian worship, we 
acquire a tacit know-how 
that shapes our action, 
including our theoretical 
activity. 
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agree that Christ’s church and its means of grace 
cover a broader field than that of special grace 
alone” (189). In other words, they both agree that 
the church— as the body of Christ—is called to 
have an impact beyond merely “spiritual” matters. 
The body of Christ is to be the agent by which the 
“significance” of Christ for “nature” is made mani-
fest. “We both acknowledge that the church does 
two things: (1) it works directly for the well-being 
of the elect, lures them to conversion, comforts, 
edifies, unites, and sanctifies them; but (2) it works 
indirectly for the well-being of the whole of civil so-
ciety, constraining it to civic virtue” (189-190). So 
the church is called to have a “leavening” effect 
on society, impacting all the spheres of human cul-
tural production. 
With that agreement in mind, we can appreci-
ate the difference; viz., they differ “in how to reach 
that good goal.” The disagreement, in other words, 
is about strategy. The national church party thinks 
that the way to have this impact is to “include civil 
society in the church” (190). Kuyper, in contrast, 
emphasizes that the church as institute should be a 
“city on a hill amid civil society” (190) from which 
the church as organism infiltrates and leavens civil 
society. As he’ll later put it, “[t]his institute does 
not cover everything that is Christian. Though the 
lamp of the Christian religion only burns within 
that institute’s walls, its light shines out through 
its windows to areas far beyond, illumining all 
the sectors and associations that appear across the 
wide range of human life and activity” (194). Thus, 
he suggests that we picture these as concentric cir-
cles, with the church as institute—administering 
the sacraments, exercising discipline, forming dis-
ciples—nourishing a vibrant core of believers who, 
as an organism, infiltrate and leaven civil society 
(194-195).28
 With this model in mind, we can see Kuyper’s 
critique of both the national church and sectari-
anism. Because the national church model “recog-
nizes only one circle,”29 so to speak (194)—because 
it can only imagine the church as institute and thus 
absorbs civil society into the institute—it thereby 
dilutes the vibrant core that is needed to be leav-
ening. In other words, by baptizing everyone, the 
national church admits into the church a host of 
non-confessors and unbelievers, and by failing to 
exercise church discipline, it loses any purifying or 
sanctifying animus with which to impact society. 
By effectively taking “the world” (i.e., civil soci-
ety, 194) into the church, the church just becomes 
worldly (196). It lacks any Christ-disciplined center 
from which to be a means of making Christ “sig-
nificant” for the rest of society.30  
 However, if the national church goes wrong by 
losing its center so to speak, sectarianism goes wrong 
by retreating into and fortifying itself within a pure 
“center” and thereby neglecting responsibility for 
“nature.” “Sects,” for Kuyper, are those configura-
tions (or rather, disfigurations) of Christianity that 
effectively put themselves “outside the context of 
human life” (191). A sect is “a tiny holy circle that has 
remained on earth by mistake and really has noth-
ing to do with the life that is lived down here” (191). 
Sectarians are also critics of the national church, 
but they criticize not only the strateg y but also the 
goal; on their account, the Gospel is not concerned 
with the institutions and practices of civil society. 
Politics, economics, the arts, and education are 
“worldly” matters not of their concern. In short, 
sectarianism rejects what God affirms as good, 
viz., creation in all its facets; thus, it also rejects any 
notion of common grace.31  Or, in the language 
Kuyper has used earlier, sectarians reject “nature.”
 Now, what does this distinction between the 
church as institute and organism have to do with 
our concern—specifically, the relationship be-
tween the church and college, worship and world-
view? Well, what’s at stake here is not only how we 
make the distinction between the two, but how we 
understand the relation between the two. So while 
Kuyper certainly emphasizes that “the institute 
does not cover everything that is Christian” (194), 
he goes on to note, recalling the concentric circle 
metaphor, that “Aside from this first circle of the 
institute and in necessary connection with it, we thus rec-
ognize another circle whose circumference is de-
termined by the length of the ray that shines out 
from the church institute over the life of people 
and nation” (195, emphases added). It seems to me 
that it is precisely Kuyper’s claim that there is a nec-
essary connection between institute and organism that 
has been lost in certain strains of Kuyperianism. 
And why does Kuyper propose a necessary con-
nection between the two? He does so precisely be-
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cause it is the worship of the church as institute 
which forms those who will be the rays of light in 
civil society.
The model I propose in Desiring the Kingdom 
does not collapse the distinction between institute 
and organism, but it does aim to (re)connect them 
in just the “necessary” way Kuyper emphasized.
Conclusion: Remember We Are Catholic
 That said, the question isn’t whether my ar-
gument is Kuyperian. My goal has been to dem-
onstrate that it is Reformed. However, in demon-
strating that it is Reformed, I don’t mean to argue 
that it is not “Catholic.” That is a charge I will hap-
pily, even eagerly, accept, for I think Reformed 
folk could do nothing better than remember we 
are Catholic.32  The Protestant Reformation is an 
Augustinian renewal movement in the church 
catholic, not a philosophical project spawned in 
the early twentieth century. The unique educa-
tional vision of the Reformed tradition will only 
be enhanced and deepened through a more inten-
tional appropriation of the accrued wisdom of our 
Catholic heritage—a wisdom that is “carried,” first 
and foremost, in the shape of Christian worship. 
If we hope to “worldview” well, we must learn to 
worship well. 
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